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We build upon the growing literature on financial literacy, which studies the prevalence of lack 
of knowledge about various financial issues, and analyze how much people know about the 
Social Security rules using a small pilot survey conducted in 2007, and a follow-up and extended 
survey funded by MRRC conducted in December of 2008. We then assess the consequences of 
the apparent prevalence of lack of information by individuals about the rules governing the 
Social Security system using a realistic and empirically-based life-cycle model of retirement 
behavior under uncertainty. We investigate the individual’s retirement and savings decisions 
under incomplete information and unawareness, in which a portion of the population does not 
know some or all of the rules of the system. We compare the outcomes in these cases to the 
outcome under full information, computing the welfare gain resulting from the acquisition of 
information regarding the Social Security system. Our analysis can illuminate the need for 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
A large body of literature in economics has tried to explain the relationship between 
social insurance, labor supply, savings and consumption behavior of individuals. An 
increasingly influential branch of this literature tries to accomplish this by solving 
complex models of rational behavior. A critical assumption of these models is that people 
know the set of rules of the Social Security system. In this paper we first investigate how 
much people know about some of the basic rules of the Social Security system, and then 
present a life-cycle model that incorporates imperfect information, and study the 
consequences on retirement decisions, and ultimately on welfare. 
We believe our research is crucial from a policy perspective because the 
incentives generated by the Social Security rules are dependent on people’s 
understanding of these rules.  If individuals do not know the rules of the system, or do not 
understand the implications of the rules on the value of their benefits, models that assume 
perfect information of the Social Security system would not yield accurate measures of 
the incentives created by the social insurance system.  
We first study people’s knowledge of the Social Security system by analyzing 
data from two surveys funded by a Seed Grant from Stony Brook’s Center for Survey 
Research and MRRC. The first survey was on the field in August of 2007, collected 
information on 500 individuals about their knowledge of some of the basic Social 
Security rules and how that knowledge was acquired. The follow-up was in the field in 
December of 2008, and we collected 507 observations. The follow-up part of the new 
survey allows us to test whether the respondents have improved in their knowledge of the 
system, and help us when modeling the information problem faced by individuals. 
Second, we provide a measure of the cost brought about by Americans’ lack of 
information on the Social Security system’s rules. To that end, we present a framework in 
which we can compute the individuals’ welfare gain from acquiring information 
regarding the Social Security system, by solving and simulating a life-cycle model of 
retirement behavior under different informational assumptions. 
Third, we discuss possible strategies that might increase individuals’ awareness of 




2. Methodology, Results, and Policy Implications 
The surveys we conducted included about 20 questions on respondents’ knowledge of 
several rules that affect their Social Security benefits, such as the age of early and normal 
retirement, and the reduction factors with respect to the normal retirement, how they 
obtained their information, and their level of financial literacy with respect to calculations 
involving social security benefits, among others. The surveys were not limited to an older 
subpopulation, so we can assess people’s knowledge of Social Security over an entire age 
profile. The surveys also included a standard battery of socio-economic, and 
demographic questions, as well as health and longevity expectations questions. 
We find that there is significant variation in people’s knowledge of Social 
Security rules, and that this knowledge varies by the year of the survey. For example, 
only 42% percent of the respondents interviewed in 2007 correctly answered the question 
“What is the youngest age at which an eligible worker can apply for his or her own 
Social Security retirement benefits?” but this percentage goes above 54% in 2008, and 
almost to 56% among those re-interviewed in that year. We observe in this case this 2008 
effect, which we interpret as suggesting that in an election year individuals are more 
informed about policy issues. The percentage of individuals answering correctly varies 
considerably by age, and in 2008 varies from around 20% among those 18 to 34, to 
around 72% for those 55 to 64. The variation with respect to income and education is 
considerably lower. 
A much lower percentage, 22.8%, gave the correct answer in 2007 to “What is the 
maximum age at which you can claim Social Security retirement benefits so that Social 
Security will adjust your benefits upward?” and the percentage is almost identical to the 
new respondents of 2008, however, it goes up to 45% among those re-interviewed. 
The latter pattern appears throughout the survey, for example regarding the 
minimum number of years necessary to be eligible to receive benefits, or the incidence of 
the earnings test, showing a large increase in knowledge among the re-interviewed 
sample, which we interpret as implying considerable promise of policy recommendations 
the objectives of which is to encourage individuals to go and find out information which 
could be relevant to them. 
 
The second step in our methodology is to compute the cost that an individual 
incurs due to his/her lack of information on Social Security rules by comparing his/her 
welfare under full information to the welfare under imperfect information. In the 
benchmark model, individuals choose how much to consume and save, how much to 
work and when to retire, and when to claim benefits from Social Security under the 
assumption that they have perfect knowledge of all the retirement incentives.  
We then present characterizations of partial information regarding Social Security 
rules. A key characterization we explore, which is an extreme case of unawareness, is 
when individuals do not know anything about the details of the system, and they decide 
when to claim Social Security benefits based on what they observe others to be doing. 
The final step of our research discusses policy alternatives aimed at increasing the 
public’s knowledge of the Social Security system. The policies that we consider include 
customizing the Social Security statement highlighting different messages according to 
the individual’s characteristics, such as age, family situation, or earnings. For example, 
young individuals might receive highlighted messages regarding the features of the 
system on which they lack information based on our findings from the surveys, while 
older individuals might receive more detailed information about the consequences of 
claiming benefits and continue working. We believe that Social Security can exploit the 
knowledge heterogeneity we find to reach the population with more targeted messages. 
Social Security Literacy and Retirement Well-Being 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
For decades a large body of literature in economics has tried to explain the relationship 
between social insurance, labor supply, savings and consumption behavior of individuals. 
An increasingly influential branch of this literature tries to accomplish this by solving 
complex models of rational behavior. A critical assumption of these models is that people 
know and understand the complex set of rules of the Social Security system. In this paper 
we first investigate in detail how much people know about some of the most basic rules 
of the Social Security system, and then modify the standard life-cycle model to 
incorporate imperfect information, and study the consequences on retirement, savings 
decisions, and ultimately on welfare. 
We believe that investigating people’s knowledge of the Social Security rules, and 
the role of this knowledge on retirement and savings outcomes, is crucial from a policy 
perspective because the incentives generated by the Social Security rules are dependent 
on people’s understanding of these rules.1  If individuals do not know the rules of the 
Social Security system, or do not understand the implications of the rules on the value of 
their benefits, models that assume perfect information of the Social Security system 
would not yield accurate measures of the incentives created by the social insurance 
system.  
We investigate how much people know about the Social Security rules, how they 
incorporate this knowledge in their retirement and savings decisions, the extent to which 
their information regarding the Social Security rules affects their retirement and wealth 
outcomes, and the implications of their imperfect knowledge on their welfare. We will 
also explore policies for improving Social Security literacy. 
In this paper we first study people’s knowledge of the Social Security system by 
analyzing data from two pilot surveys funded by a Seed Grant from Stony Brook’s Center 
for Survey Research (CSR) and MRRC. The first survey we put on the field in late 
August of 2007, collected information on 500 individuals about their knowledge of some 
                                                 
1 Gustman and Steinmeier (2001), Blinder and Krueger (2004), Cao and Hill (2005), and Mastrobuoni 
(2006) focus on knowledge of the Social Security system, especially about expected benefit levels. Mitchell 
(1988), Starr-McCluer and Sundén (1999), Stevens and Chan (2005), Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai 
(2007) analyze pension knowledge. Lusardi and Mitchell (2005, 2007) focus on general financial literacy. 
Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) analyze the link between cognition and preferences. 
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of the most basic Social Security rules and how that knowledge was acquired. The 
follow-up was in the field in December of 2008, and we collected 507 observations. The 
follow-up part of the new survey allows us to test whether the respondents have retained 
the particular information which was given to them during the initial survey, and help us 
when modeling the information problem faced by individuals. 
Second, we provide a measure of the cost brought about by Americans’ lack of 
information on the Social Security system’s rules. To that end, we present a framework in 
which we can compute the individuals’ welfare gain from acquiring information 
regarding the Social Security system. We accomplish this by solving and simulating a 
life-cycle model of retirement behavior under different informational assumptions, and 
allowing for the endogeneity of the individuals’ level of knowledge regarding the rules of 
the system. We find that the proportion of individuals who benefit from better 
information increases with age, and by age 60 this proportion reaches around 95% of 
individuals (it is only around 28% at age 40). At all ages, those who benefit from better 
information are willing to pay a sizable proportion of their wealth (more than 50%) to 
have access to the best information possible. 
Third, based on our results from these analyses, in particular the assessment of the 
cost of imperfect information, and equivalently the gains from full information regarding 
the Social Security system, we will discuss possible strategies that might increase 
individuals’ awareness of the rules of the system, and evaluate which strategies would 
lead to more welfare-improving outcomes. 
 
2. Research Overview 
We have used a Seed Grant obtained from Stony Brook’s CSR and funding from MRRC 
to conduct two phone surveys on a small representative sample of the U.S. adult 
population to gather information on respondents’ knowledge of Social Security rules. The 
survey included about 20 questions on respondents’ knowledge of several rules that affect 
their Social Security benefits, such as the age of early and normal retirement and the 
reduction factors with respect to the normal retirement, how they obtained their 
information, and their level of financial literacy with respect to calculations involving 
social security benefits, among others. A randomly chosen sub-group of respondents 
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were also given the correct answer to one of the Social Security rule questions on the 
survey. One of the advantages of this survey is that it is not limited to an older 
subpopulation, so we can assess people’s knowledge of Social Security over an entire age 
profile. 
We have analyzed the data from the original and new surveys to assess 1) the extent 
of the information problems regarding the basic rules of the Social security system, 2) 
whether the prevalence of informational gaps differs across demographic and 
socioeconomic groups, and 3) how it varies with the level of financial literacy in the 
population.  The pilot survey also included a standard battery of socio-economic, and 
demographic questions, as well as health and longevity expectations questions. 
The results from the survey show that there is significant variation in people’s 
knowledge of Social Security rules, and that this knowledge varies by the year of the 
survey. For example, only 42% percent of the respondents interviewed in 2007 correctly 
answered the question “What is the youngest age at which an eligible worker can apply 
for his or her own Social Security retirement benefits?” but this percentage goes above 
54% in 2008, and almost to 56% among those re-interviewed in that year. We can see in 
the case of this relatively simple question, a 2008 effect, which we interpret as showing 
that due to being an election year it might be that even among new interviewees the level 
of knowledge had increased, appears. The percentage of individuals answering correctly 
varies considerably by age, and in 2008 varies from around 20% among those 18 to 34, to 
around 72% for those 55 to 64. The variation with respect to income is considerably 
lower. 
A much lower percentage, 22.8%, gave the correct answer in 2007 to “What is the 
maximum age at which you can claim Social Security retirement benefits so that Social 
Security will adjust your benefits upward?” and the percentage is almost identical to the 
new respondents of 2008, however, it goes up to 45% among those re-interviewed in 
2008.  
The latter pattern appears throughout the survey, for example regarding the minimum 
number of years necessary to be eligible to receive benefits, or the incidence of the 
earnings test, showing a large increase in knowledge among the re-interview sample, 
which we interpret as implying considerable promise of policy recommendations the 
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objectives of which is to encourage individuals to go and find out information which 
could be relevant to them. 
Additionally, we find that 55.7% of the individuals who were already receiving some 
kind of government benefits, responded ‘yes’ to the question “Do you think that you 
should have had more information about possible changes to the system that could affect 
you?” suggesting that the informational problems may have resulted in costs, which were 
observed by the individual ex post.  
The second step in our methodology is to compute the cost that an individual incurs 
due to his/her lack of information on Social Security rules by comparing his/her welfare 
under full information to the welfare under imperfect information. We use the full 
information characterization of the model as the benchmark model which builds upon the 
work of Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2007), and Benitez-Silva et al. (2009), but adds 
employment uncertainty. In that case  individuals choose how much to consume and 
save, how much to work and when to retire, and when to claim benefits from Social 
Security under the assumption that they have perfect knowledge of all the retirement 
incentives.  
We then present departures from the full information assumption and provide several 
possible characterizations of partial information regarding Social Security rules by 
incorporating recent advances in decision theory and game theory. For example, Fagin 
and Halpern (1988), and Modica and Rustichini (1994, 1999) introduce new logics for 
belief and knowledge to differentiate full awareness and partial awareness. Heifetz, Meier 
and Schipper (2006) and Li (2006a) characterize multi-person information structures with 
unawareness. Feinberg (2004, 2005), Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2007), Li (2006b), 
Rego and Halpern (2007) define solution concepts for games with unaware players. 
Generally speaking, under incomplete information individuals aggregate all 
possibilities without differentiating them (for example assuming that the adjustments for 
early and late retirement are identical), resulting in biased assessments of the trade-offs 
they face. On the other hand, under unawareness, they completely ignore some of the 
possibilities, and thus cannot exploit any relevant information. One key characterization 
we explore, which is an extreme case of unawareness, is when individuals do not know 
4
anything about the details of the system, and they decide when to claim Social Security 
benefits based on what they observe others to be doing.  
The comparison of individuals’ welfare in full information and partial information 
cases allow us to compute the welfare gain resulting from moving from unawareness to 
the full information solution. Using this approach, we also compute bounds for the social 
cost of financial illiteracy regarding the Social Security rules, and at the same time 
provide a policy tool for the government when considering policy interventions about 
information issues of the social insurance system. 
We characterize the individual’s problem using a structural dynamic life-cycle model 
of retirement behavior under uncertainty. The structural approach employed in the project 
allows us to control for the possible endogeneity of information on Social Security. An 
individual’s information on Social Security may have been endogenously determined 
based on his/her cost of acquiring information.  Therefore, we incorporate into the model 
the individual’s cost of knowledge acquisition, which is likely to vary with education and 
income. 
The dynamic nature of the model allows us to follow changes in wealth accumulation 
and labor supply decisions over time. When people make decisions under imperfect 
knowledge, they may change behavior and take corrective measures when they find out 
that their expectations diverge from actual realizations. In our model, people may invest 
more in learning about their Social Security benefits as they near retirement. If they 
realize that their expectations of benefits are different from their actual benefits, they may 
accelerate wealth accumulation or postpone retirement. 
The final step of our research uses the results from the pilot and new surveys, and the 
welfare implications of the dynamic structural model to discuss policy alternatives aimed 
at increasing the public’s knowledge of the Social Security system. The policies that we 
consider include customizing the Social Security statement highlighting different 
messages according to the individual’s characteristics, such as age, family situation, or 
earnings. For example, young individuals might receive highlighted messages regarding 
the features of the system on which they lack information based on our findings from the 
pilot and new surveys, while older individuals might receive more detailed information 
about the consequences of claiming benefits and continuing working. We hypothesize 
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that we will find considerable heterogeneity in the information structure of individuals, 
and Social Security can exploit this heterogeneity to reach the population with more 
targeted messages. 
The next section gives some details about the surveys we put in the field in 2007 and 
2008 to assess the level of knowledge regarding simple Social Security rules by 
Americans, and section four presents the dynamic model we will use to assess the welfare 
consequences of lack of knowledge. The final section of the paper concludes. 
 
3. Results from the Surveys on Social Security Knowledge 
We have conducted two telephone surveys through Stony Brook’s Center for Survey 
Research during August 2007 (funded with a Seed Grant from the V.P. for Research at 
SB), and December 2008 (funded by MRRC). Samples of 500 and 507 observations, 
weighted to be nationally representative. 179 observations of the 2008 survey were re-
interviews. 
Here we will analyze some of the responses (those we believe to be the simplest 
questions) and we will discuss the pattern that emerges regarding the level of knowledge 
over time for those who are re-interview, as well as the pattern by age, education, and 
income categories. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the responses to the question regarding the Early Retirement 
Age, and we can see that only around 50% of individuals get this answer right, and we 
can also see a considerable improvement from 2007 to 2008, maybe suggesting a time 
effect product of the fact that 2008 was an election year, in which some discussions of 
Social Security reached the debate. There is some re-interview effect for this question, 
but it is small. 
Figure 1 focuses on the responses to the knowledge of the NRA (also known as 
Full Retirement Age), which is considerably better, and shows some re-interview effect. 
This latter effect is quite in Figure 2 regarding the maximum retirement age (age 70), re-
interviewers do much better, and the time effect all but disappears, suggesting that might 
only affect the simpler issues. Notice, however, that the level of exact knowledge of this 
item is quite low. 
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Figure 3 shows the low level of knowledge regarding the minimum eligibility 
requirements to receive retirement benefits, and again shows a clear re-interview effect. 
Figures 4 and 5 deal with a more complex provision, that of the earnings test, and 
we can see again that re-interviewers do better, but overall individuals do not do much 
better than a simple coin toss, and the natural improvement with the second question 
which provides some information to individuals. 
 
Table 1. Responses to the question: What is the youngest age at which an eligible 
worker can apply for his or her own Social Security retirement benefits? (All 
respondents 2007 and 2008) 
 
Response Frequency Percent Cummulative percent 
Less than 50 52 8.37 8.37 
51 to 61 108 17.39 25.76 
Exactly 62 298 47.99 73.75 
63 to 64 15 2.42 76.17 
Exactly 65 83 13.37 89.53 
Over 66 37 5.96 95.49 
Don't know 28 4.51 100 












Table 2. Responses to the question: What is the youngest age at which an eligible 











Less than 50 9.57% 7.5% 6.19% 8.37% 
51 to 61 19.14% 15.5% 15.46% 17.39% 
Exactly 62 41.98% 54% 55.67% 47.99% 
63 to 64 2.47% 3% 1.03% 2.42% 
Exactly 65 15.43% 10% 13.4% 13.37% 
Over 66 5.56% 6% 7.22% 5.96% 
Don’t know 5.86% 4% 1.03% 4.51% 
































2007 respondents 2008 new respondents 2008 re-interviewed respondents
 
Figure 1. What is the earliest age of retirement at which Social Security would pay you 





































2007 respondents 2008 new respondents 2008 re-interviewed respondents
 
Figure 2. What is the maximum age at which you can claim Social Security retirement benefits so that 

































2007 respondents 2008 new respondents 2008 re-interviewed respondents
 
Figure 3. What is the minimum number of working years that qualify you to receive Social 




























2007 respondents 2008 new respondents 2008 re-interviewed respondents
 
Figure 4. If you earned $10,000 in a given year from working after you began receiving Social 






























2007 respondents 2008 new respondents 2008 re-interviewed respondents
 
Figure 5. What about if you earned $20,000 in a given year from working after you began 
receiving Social Security Retirement Benefits at age 62, do you think your Social Security 
benefits would be reduced?  
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Figures 6 to 9 analyze how the knowledge on the Early and Maximum Retirement ages 
changes with age and educational categories. As expected in both dimensions knowledge 
improves as age and education increases, and we can observe a time effect when 
comparing 2007 and 2008, but again mostly the product of those re-interviewed. Notice 
that even among individuals very close to retirement the knowledge of the Maximum 
Retirement Age is surprisingly low with only around 40% of those in the 55 to 64 age 
range getting it right, and even for the Early Retirement Age it only reaches around 70% 































18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 or more
Source:  SB 2007/2008 Social Security Study (all respondents from each year)
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Less than HS HS graduates Some college Bachelor's and above
Source:  SB 2007/2008 Social Security Study (all respondents from each year)
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Source:  SB 2007/2008 Social Security Study (all respondents from each year)
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Source:  SB 2007/2008 Social Security Study (all respondents from each year)
by income levels
Knowledge of the Early Retirement Age
2007 2008
 



































Source:  SB 2007/2008 Social Security Study (all respondents from each year)
by income levels
Knowledge of Maximum Retirement Age
2007 2008
 
Figure 11. Knowledge of the MRA by Income categories 
Figures 10 and 11, explore the relationship between knowledge and income, and 
here the results are much less clear, with only those who made over 100k doing clearly 
better than the rest. The results also suggest that those who benefit the most from the re-
interviews are the lower income categories, which is quite encouraging as a policy 
conclusion. 
We then conclude that the general level of knowledge of some of the simpler 
Social Security rules is quite low, even among older, educated and higher income 
individuals, and the lack of knowledge gets worse as the type of information increases in 
complexity or refers to issues that happen later in the process. We also conclude that 
there is a clear re-interview effect, which is quite encouraging since most of these 
individuals where not given any answers to the questions, and yet they do much better 
more than a year after the first interview. 
One possible reaction to all this evidence is to wonder if this matters much. I 
might not know the early retirement age is 62, or I might not know what is my exact 
Normal Retirement Age, but this might have small welfare consequences for me, small 
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enough not to compensate the cost of acquiring accurate information. We try to explore 
this issue in the next section. 
 
4. The Dynamic Life-Cycle Model 
The ultimate objective of setting up a model of retirement behavior is to be able to 
perform a welfare analysis of different information structures. This is important because 
we do not want to stop our analysis at the point of showing that individuals have limited 
knowledge of the details of the system. While this is interesting, and we are one of the 
first researchers to show the limited knowledge regarding some of the less complicated 
and supposedly common knowledge features of the system, showing that this is the case 
without assessing wether this is a serious matter in terms of what the agents are losing by 
not acquiring the additional knowledge is in our opinion leaving the research half done. 
The welfare analysis is key, because it could be easily conjectured that the gains 
from acquring all the necessary knowledge to behave optimally might be too small, and 
therefore for most individuals could never compensate the cost of acquiring such 
knowledge. If on the other hand, we find that the gains from having good information are 
large, it would have to be argued that the costs are very large, maybe because of how 
tough is for individuals to access information or maybe they are misperceiving the 
welfare gains they could be enjoying. In any case, large welfare gains would suggest that 
policies targetted at incresaing the understanding of the system would be worth our 
efforts and resources. 
 In order to make those important welfare calculations we need two things. First a 
benchmark model. Such a model has to have several properties, but mainly has to be a 
fairly good approximation to actual behavior. Ironically, finding a good model under the 
assumption of perfect knowledge of the incentive structure to reflect a reality in which we 
know individuals do not have such good information is bound to require a number of 
additional mechanisms to match the data, like a system of beliefs about the future, which 
we model as sources of uncertainty. Second, we need to explicitly model an alternative 
informational structure to compare to the benchmark model. There are many possible 
informational structures consistent with what we have observed in our surveys, and we 
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have chosen, for the moment, to illustrate the results of assuming one of them, but as we 
will discuss below there are others we can analyze and study. 
We build upon an established framework to analyze retirement behavior, modeling 
the complete set of incentives provided by the Earnings Test and ARF adjustment. The 
model used in this paper is closely related to models presented in Rust and Phelan (1997) 
and Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003, 2006). Rust and Phelan (1997) did not 
model consumption and savings decisions, but did estimate the parameters of the model, 
using a Nested Fixed-Point algorithm, instead of calibrating them. Benítez-Silva, 
Buchinsky, and Rust (2003, 2006) and as mentioned earlier Benítez-Silva and Heiland 
(2007), and Benítez-Silva et al. (2009) present the most closely related models, which are 
calibrated to match aggregate data and household level data from the Health and 
Retirement Study. Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003, 2006) model the Social 
Security Disability Insurance decisions on top of the OASI incentives. Unlike the 
structural model developed in the present paper, these earlier models (or any other 
structural models we are aware of) do not explicitly account for the possibility of 
affecting the Actuarial Reduction Factor, or assess the consequences of different 
informational structures. Our model also shares a number of characteristics with the work 
of French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), and Blau (2008), among other 
researchers who solve, simulate, and in some cases estimate, dynamic retirement models 
under uncertainty. 
The model presented here predicts individuals’ labor supply, benefit initiation and 
receipt, and earnings. The model also predicts wealth accumulation and consumption 
decisions, but we focus here for the moment on the claiming decision. As discussed in the 
papers mentioned above, the simulations of the model are broadly consistent with 
empirical evidence on a variety of measures. 
 
Short Description of the Model 
We assume that individuals maximize the expected discounted stream of future utility, 
where the per period utility function  depends on consumption , leisure l , 
health status , and age . We specify a utility function for which more consumption is 
better than less, with agents expressing a moderate level of risk aversion. The flip side of 
( , , , )u c l h t c
h t
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utility of leisure is the disutility of work. We assume that the utility (disutility of work) is 
an increasing function of age, is higher for individuals who are in worse health than 
individuals who are in good health, and is lower for individuals with higher human 
capital measured by the average wage. In addition, we assume that the worse an 
individual's health is, the lower their overall level of utility is, holding everything else 
constant. Moreover, we assume that individuals obtain utility from bequeathing wealth to 
heirs or to institutions after they die. This model assumes that individuals are forward 
looking, and discount future periods at a constant rate β , assumed here to be equal to 
0.96. The model also allows for a variety of sources of uncertainty, like lifetime 
uncertainty, health uncertainty, wage uncertainty, and employment uncertainty. The latter 
is an innovation of this paper with respect to those we are directly building upon. To 
model this uncertainty we use the empirical distribution of transitions from employment 
to unemployment using the CPS from 1986 to 2006. 
Any person who is not already receiving Social Security Old Age benefits is 
eligible to apply for OASI benefits. Individuals with at least 40 quarters of earnings 
covered for OASI before reaching their 62  birthday are eligible to apply, and benefit 
award is guaranteed. In the present version of the model, we allow decisions to be made 
on an annual basis and assume no lag between application date and date of first receipt. 
nd
Calculation of benefits and the reduction factors are as explained in Benítez-Silva 
and Heiland (2007), assuming an NRA of 66. In particular, the number of checks 
received in a year depends on the earnings after claiming: The number of checks (or the 
benefit amount on some checks received towards the end of the period) are reduced, 
reflecting the 50% rate on labor incomes exceeding the Earnings Test limit between 62 
and the January of the year a person turns 66 (33% thereafter). In other words, 
adjustments to benefits and ARFs occurs in accordance with the earnings and the 
Earnings Test limit, and we do not consider the possibility that beneficiaries ask Social 
Security for a reduction of benefits or return benefits received. Even though we set up an 
annual decision-making process, the Social Security Earnings Test is enforced 
semiannually; that is, the benefits received by a beneficiary are adjusted, after reaching 
the NRA, for the earnings in excess of the Earnings Test limit, as long as six months or 





We solve the dynamic life-cycle model by backward induction, and by discretizing the 
space for the continuous state variables. The terminal age is 100 and the age when 
individuals are assumed to enter the labor force is 21. Prior to their  birthday, agents 
in our model make a leisure and consumption decision in each period. At 62 and until age 
70, individuals decide on leisure, consumption, and application for OASI benefits, 
denoted { , at the beginning of each period, where  denotes le ,  denotes 
, which is treated as a continuous decision variable, and  denotes the 
individual's Social Security benefi  claiming decisions. After age 70 it is assumed that all 
individuals have claimed benefits, and again only consumption and leisure choices are 
possible. Leisure time is normalized to 1, where  is defined as not working at all, 
 corresponds to full time work, and l  denotes part-time work. These 
quantities correspond to the amount of waking time spent non-working, assuming that a 
full-time job requires 2,000 hours per year and a part-time job requires 800 hours per 
year. We assume two possible values for . If  equals 1 the agent has initiated the 
receipt of benefits. If the individual has not filed for benefits or is not eligible then b  is 
equal to 0. 
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If benefits are claimed before the NRA, the monthly benefit amount is calculated 
similar to Equation 1. For a NRA of 66 years, the reduction factor if claimed at 62 is 
75%, 80.% if claimed at 63, 86.67% if claimed at 63, and 93.33% if claimed at 65. Due to 
the Earnings Test, benefit initiation between the ERA and the NRA does not necessarily 
imply benefit receipt, nor is the reduction in the benefit rate necessarily permanent after 
the NRA as a result of the adjustment of the ARFs, as discussed above (see Equation 2). 
In particular, we use an annual Earnings Test limit of $12,480 between 62 and 65 and 
$33,240 between 65 and 66 (these numbers reflect the 2006 limits). In the former period, 
benefits are reduced at a rate of $1 per $2 of earnings above the limit, and $1 per $3 of 
earnings above the limit for the latter period. These are the correct rules for someone who 
turns 66 in December. Because those whose birthday is earlier in the year face the higher 
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limit and lower tax rate for less than a year (January to month of birthday), we have also 
simulated two alternative versions, one with the $12,480 limit throughout, and another 
using $20,760, the midpoint between the two limits, and a tax rate of 50%. The results of 
these models do not differ markedly from those presented in Table 5 and are available 
from the authors upon request. Those claiming after 66 earn the delayed retirement credit. 
We model it following the rates faced by the 1943–54 cohorts, of 2/3 of 1% for each 
month not claimed between age 66 and 70. 
We also incorporate a detailed model of taxation of other income, including the 
progressive federal income tax schedule (including the negative tax known as the EITC—
Earned Income Tax Credit), and state and local income, sales, and property taxes. 
Individuals whose combined income (including Social Security benefits) exceeds a given 
threshold must pay federal income taxes on a portion of their Social Security benefits. 
We incorporate these rules in our model as well as the 15.75% Social Security payroll 
tax. 
The model allows for four different sources of uncertainty: (a) lifetime uncertainty: 
modeled to follow the Life Tables of the United States with age-specific survival 
probabilities; (b) wage uncertainty: modeled to follow a log-normal distribution, function 
of average wages as explained in more detail below; (c) health uncertainty: assumed to 
evolve in a Markovian fashion using empirical transition probabilities from a variety of 
household surveys, including the NLSY79 and the HRS; (d) employment uncertainty: 
modeled following the empirical transition probabilities in the CPS from employment to 
unemployment at all ages, and assuming individuals who lose their jobs receive half a 
year of unemployment benefits. The random draws to simulate these uncertainties are the 
same for all the models compared in this paper, such that the differences presented are 
due only to the changes in the incentive schemes. 
The  of an individual at any point during the life cycle can be summarized by 
five state variables: (i) current age t ; (ii) net (tangible) wealth ; (iii) the individual's 
Social Security benefit claiming state ; (iv) the individual's health status, and (v) the 





This translates into a problem with over half a million states in which to solve the 
model (80 periods, 15 discretized wealth states, 8 discretized average wage states, 3 
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health states, and 18 Social Security states). We are able to solve this model and simulate 
it 10,000 times in under 20 minutes in a Dual-Processor Linux Machine with 3.6GHz 
Xeon Processors using Gauss, and exploiting its capability to link dynamic libraries 
written in C by the authors and some of their co-authors. These C libraries perform over 
95% of the computations involved in solving and simulating these models. The code used 
for these simulations is available upon request, and will eventually be available on the 
Web. 
For computational simplicity, we assume that decisions are made annually rather 
than monthly, but we allow for the benefit adjustments due to earnings above the 
Earnings Test limit to happen semi-annually. This means that, although individuals can 
only decide to claim benefits at the time they turn 62, 63, etc., their Social Security state 
can be updated every year, depending on their labor earnings, to reflect that their benefits 
will be adjusted for benefits withheld for periods of six months or one year. Since the 
adjustment in benefits becomes effective only after they reach the NRA, individuals still 
receive benefits at the original claiming rate in the period between the time of 
withholding of benefits until the NRA, consistent with current rules. 
The  variable can assume up to 14 mutually exclusive values between 62 and 66: 
 (not entitled to benefits),  (entitled to OASI benefits at the ERA), and 
 represents the remaining 12 Social 
Security states corresponding to the level of benefits individuals will receive when they 
reach the NRA. For individuals who decide to claim after the NRA,  can take four 
additional values, age 67 to 70, since everyone is assumed to claim no later than age 70. 
We created an additional (implicit state) variable, , which can assume up to 5 
mutually exclusive values:  (all benefits received; that is, no benefits withheld), 
 (representing an original claim at age 62 of someone who had some benefits 
withheld; this applies, for example, to individuals with a  equal to 62.5 , 63 , or 
),  (representing an original claim at age 63 for someone who had some 
benefits withheld), ssn  (representing an original claim at age 64 for someone who 
had some benefits withheld), etc. With this structure we are able to separate, for example, 
tss
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whether someone is a 63 claimer, denoted by , or is really a 62 claimer who has 
accumulated one year of withheld benefits, represented here by . These two 
individuals will receive the same amount of benefits after the NRA, but their benefit 
would differ before the NRA, as in our previous example. 
= 63tss
= 63tss n
In addition to age, wealth, health, Social Security status, Benefit Adjustment status, 
and current income, the average indexed wage is a key variable in the dynamic model, 
serving two roles: (1) it acts as a measure of  permanent income that serves as a 
convenient  sufficient statistic for capturing serial correlation and predicting the evolution 
of annual wage earnings; and (2) it is key to accurately model the rules governing 
payment of the Social Security benefits. An individual's highest 35 years of earnings are 
averaged and the resulting Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) is denoted as aw . If there is 
less than 35 years of earnings when the person first becomes eligible for OASI, then the 5 
lowest years of earnings are dropped and the remaining wages are averaged. Social 
Security usually reports the monthly equivalent or AIME. The PIA is the potential Social 
Security benefit rate for retiring at the NRA. It is a piece-wise linear, concave function of 
, whose value is denoted by 
t
taw ( )tpia aw
1
. 
In principle, one needs to keep as state variables the entire past earnings history. To 
avoid this, we follow Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2007) and approximate the evolution of 
average wages in a Markovian fashion; that is, period t +  average wage, , is 
predicted using only age, , current average wage, , and current period earnings, 
1taw +
t ttaw y . 
Within a log-normal regression model, we follow Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust 
(2003 and 2006), such that the average wages take the form:  
2
4 5t t t1 1 2 3log( ) = log g( ) .taw aw( ) lot ty  γ γ γ γ γ ε+ + + + +
2
+  (1) 
RThe  for this type of regression is very high, with an extremely small estimated 
standard error, resulting from the low variability of the {  sequences. This is a key 
aspect of the model, given the important computational simplification that allows us to 
accurately model the Social Security rules in our DP model with a minimal number of 
state variables. 
}taw
We then use the observed sequence of average wages as regressors to estimate the 
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following log-normal regression model of an individual's annual earnings:  
  21 1 2 3 4log( ) = log( ) .t ty aw t ttα α α α+ η+ + + +  (2) 
This equation describes the evolution of earnings for full-time employment. Part-time 
workers are assumed to earn a pro-rata share of the full-time earnings level (that is, part-
time earnings are  of the full-time wage level given in equation 0.8 800/2000⋅
2
(2)). The 
factor of  incorporates the assumption that the rate of pay working part time is 80% of 
the full-time rate. Using the history of earnings from the restricted HRS data set, we 
obtained very high 
0.8
R  using this methodology. 
The advantage of using  instead of the actual Average Indexed Earnings is that 
 becomes a sufficient statistic for the person's earnings history. Thus, we need only 




1( ( ))g k adjm
(1), 
rather than having to keep track of the entire earnings history, in order to determine the 
35 highest earnings years, which the AIE requires. 
For the 1943–54 cohort the NRA is 66 and the PIA is permanently reduced after the 




, where  is the number of 
years prior to the NRA but after the ERA that the individual first starts receiving OASI 
benefits and  corrects for periods where no benefits were received, due to earnings 
above the Earnings test limit. Before the NRA, benefits are reduced by an actuarial 
reduction factor of . In the absence of adjustments to the ARFs, the actuarial 
reduction rate for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is , which results in a reduced 
benefit of 75% of the PIA for an individual who first starts receiving OASI benefits at 




To increase the incentives to delay retirement, the 1983 Social Security reforms 
gradually increased the NRA from 65 to 67 and increased the delayed retirement credit 
(DRC). This is a permanent increase in the PIA by a factor of , where l  denotes 
the number of years after the NRA that the individual delays receiving OASI benefits. 
The rate  is being gradually increased over time. The relevant value for the 1943 to 
1954 cohort is , which corresponds to an increase in 8% in benefits per year 
of delay after the NRA. The maximum value of l  is MRA
2 }g l
2g
NRA, where MRA denotes a −
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“maximum retirement age'' (currently 70), beyond which further delays in retirement 
yield no further increases in PIA. As noted above, it is not optimal to delay applying for 
OASI benefits beyond the MRA, because due to mortality, further delays generally 
reduce the present value of OASI benefits the person will collect over their remaining 
lifetime. 
We assume that the individual's utility is given by  
  1( , , , ) = ( , , ) log( ) 2 ,t






h ( , , )age h aw
 (3) 
where  denotes the health status and φ  is a weight that can be interpreted as 
the relative disutility of work. We use the same specification for φ  and the disutility from 
working as in Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). The disutility of work 
increases with age, and is uniformly higher the worse one’s health is. If an individual is in 
good health, the disutility of work increases much more gradually with age compared to 
the poor health, or disabled health, states. The disutility of work decreases with average 
wage. We postulate that high wage workers, especially highly educated professionals, 
have better working conditions than most lower wage blue collar workers, whose jobs are 
more likely to involve less pleasant, more repetitive, working conditions and a higher 
level of physical labor. 
We assume that there are no time or financial costs involved in applying for OASI 
benefits. 
0γ →γ  indexes the individual's level of risk aversion. As The parameter  the 
utility of consumption approaches . We use log( )c = .37γ − , which corresponds to a 
moderate degree of risk aversion; that is, implied behavior that is slightly more risk 
averse than that implied by logarithmic preferences. 
 This benchmark model is closely related to the ones presented in Benítez-Silva 
and Heiland (2007), and Benítez-Silva et al. (2009), and does a good job at matching 
some of the most elusive evidence regarding individual behavior at older ages. As 
mentioned before this model improves upon those mentioned by also modeling 
employment uncertainty and unemployment insurance, and does an excellent job at 
matching the evidence on the claiming behavior in the United States. 
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 Table 3 below shows the proportion of retirement claiming by age predicted by 
the model compared to the actual data using the Statistical Supplement to the Social 
Security Bulletin in its 2007 edition, which uses 2006 data. We can easily see how well 
the model does in replicating the data, with only an over-prediction of claiming at age 63 
compared with the Supplement. 
 
Table 3. Actual vs. Simulated Retirement Claiming. 
Age Actual (%) Simulated (%) 
62 53.8 52.93 
63 8.56 15.84 
64 10.4 11.16 
65 22.3 17.82 
66+ 2.7 2.22 
 
Of course, this fairly accurate prediction is accomplished with a host of 
assumptions, chief among them the fact that individuals know, understand, and optimally 
respond to the complex set of rules of the U.S. Social Security system. This assumption is 
clearly at odds with the evidence we presented in the previous section, unless we could 
argue that agents behave rationally and optimally because the cost of acquiring the 
information is too large compared with the gains from acquiring it. 
The next step, and the key to this second part of our research, is to use this model 
to assess the consequences of setting up a different information structure, one in which 
individuals would not have full information about the retirement system. We then 
proceed to set up such a framework, while at the same time keeping all the other sources 
of uncertainty constant, and matching again the best we can the average claiming 
behavior in the data. 
There are many possible informational structures we could set up, but not all of 
them are easy to incorporate in our framework. It is not clear which of these structures 
better reflects reality, and it might not be possible to actually decide over the possible 
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informational structures, at the end of the day it is probably a good idea to perform a 
welfare analysis under a number of these structures to see if a pattern emerges. We have 
chosen a very simple sub-optimal information structure, one in which individuals choose 
to copy the people around them when deciding when to claim benefits. This means agents 
do not behave optimally, and do not take into account their state variables when making 
the decision, and instead they behave like the average person in the population, following 
the optimal distribution of claiming conditional on not having claimed before. This 
means for example, that when an individual reaches age 62, does not know what is 
optimal for him or her to do, but knows that around 52% of those who reach that age and 
are eligible claim at that age, and that is what they do probabilistically to match that 
average. The actual implementation of this informational structure in the dynamic model 
is technically complex since a probabilistic set of actions is hard to model, and it forces 
as to solve the model under the assumption that individuals claim as early as possible 
when they reach an age without having claimed before, but only get the continuation 
value of having claimed following the empirical distribution of the optimal behavior. 
In the simulations of the model it is a bit easier since we just compare 
probabilistic draws with the average claiming hazard implied by optimal behavior. 
Notice that by behaving like the average person we will on average observe that 
regarding claiming the two alternative models will basically seem identical, but there will 
be welfare differences because under the new information structure individuals ignore 
some of their information and trust the people around them to decide what is optimal for 
them. 
We then re-solve and re-simulate the model under this new structure in which 
individuals copy those around them instead of computing their optimal choice. Once we 
have re-solved the model we can perform a welfare calculation in which in this case we 
compute the willingness to pay of individuals in order to avoid moving from the optimal 
information structure to the new information structure. We know individuals would have 
to be compensated to move to the suboptimal informational structure, the question is by 
how much, by what proportion of their wealth. 
Our initial findings indicate that the welfare improvement from having access to 
complete information vary by age, which could be expected, since the gains for certain 
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individuals of a better informational structure many years into the future is small. On the 
other hand, for those close to retirement the gains are very large, and most of them 
benefit from the better structure. 
We find that 95% of those who reach age 60 would have to be compensated with 
more than 50% of their wealth in order to move to the sub-optimal informational 
structure, which means they value the information tremendously. This is quite coherent 
since they are very close to retirement age, and whether they make the right decision or 
not has a large effect on welfare. However, only 28% of those who reach age 40 value the 
complete information structure, but those who do value it, do it as much as the 60 year 
old agent. The percentage of those who benefit from good information goes up to 32% at 
age 50, and again the welfare gain is very large for those who value it. 
These results, while preliminary, are consistent with the surveys with respect to 
the effect of age, given that younger individuals are less likely to gain from the better 
information, and therefore it should not come as a surprise that they are less likely to 
acquire it. On the other hand, those who benefit from it at any age see a large welfare 
gain which indicates that policies directed at enhancing the Social Security literacy of 
individuals should pay off in terms of welfare gains in the population. 
  
5. Conclusions 
This paper is one of the first studies that we are aware of, which investigates the 
implications of people’s knowledge of Social Security rules on their wealth, retirement 
outcomes, and welfare using a structural life-cycle model. The methodology outlined in 
this proposal allows us to go beyond documenting the extent of the knowledge within the 
population regarding the rules of the Social Security system. It allows us to provide, in a 
life-cycle framework, a formal characterization of the role of information on Social 
Security rules in the individual’s decisions-making, the likely costs attached to acquiring 
it, and the welfare costs of not obtaining it. 
In this version of the paper we have chosen a particular sub-optimal informational 
structure to compare with the full-information case, but many others are possible, and it is 
debatable which informational structure should be chosen to more accurately perform the 
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welfare gains from informational investments. It seems to us that faced with this situation 
it would be ideal to show a range of welfare calculations depending on the informational 
assumptions we make. This is what we hope to do in future versions of this work. 
We believe it is a natural extension of our work to consider how individuals learn 
about the incentive structures of the system. The survey results show that there is 
considerable learning among re-interviewers, which suggests that just by being asked 
individuals feel compelled to learn about the issue, which also suggests that considerable 
gains can be obtained with relatively small investments that float questions among the 
population. A more complex issue is the actual learning process, and the balancing of 
gains and costs underlying the decision to invest in informational improvements. 
Finally, it is clear that given the pervasive lack of knowledge, and the large gains 
from additional information, especially for older individuals, we have to be very aware of 
the predictions of our models under the assumption of perfect information, especially 
regarding the consequences of policy changes assumed to be understood and followed 
rationally by individuals. Our framework can provide some guidance in assessing the 
robustness of policy recommendations to different informational structures.
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